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ABSTRACT 
Present mission requirements and increased weapons 
technology dictate that there is a need to replace the US 
Army Infantry's medium antiarmor Dragon weapon system. In 
lieu of the Dragon, the US Army is opting to field a new 
system called the Javelin Antitank Weapon System. This 
thesis explores the potential for the Javel in to enhance the 
operational effectiveness of the Mechanized Infantry assets 
of the US Army. This analysis im::luoes the deve lopment of 
Mechanized Infantry scenario'S which employ the Janus(A) h igh 
resolution COlT.bat model. These scenari.os model 
force-on-force trials of mechanized versus fu l ly modernized 
armor heavy threats in deliberate defense and movement to 
contact missions . 
Results of the experimental data analysis indicate that 
the Javelin performs superior to the Dragon in terms of the 
mechanized force's range of anti armor engagements, 
lethality, target stealing, and survivability. The findings 
to this thesis could benefit the US Army in force structure 
and antiarmor weapon requirements with the future fielding 
of the Javelin to Mechanized Infantry units. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Present mission requirements and increased weapons 
technology dictate that there is a need to replace the US 
Army Infantry's medium anti armor Dragon weapon system. In 
lieu of the Dragon, the US Army is opting to field a new 
weapon called the Javelin Antitank Weapon System. 
Integrating the. Javelin into the infantry's weapons 
inventory could be costly and unnecessary or it may be a 
beneficial and worthy colllbat multiplier. In the interest of 
evaluating the weapon l this thesis explores the potential 
for the Javelin to enhance the operational effectiveness of 
Mechanized Infantry assets of the US Army. 
This analysis includes the development of Mechanized 
Infantry scenarios which employ the Janus(A} high resolution 
combat model. These scenarios represent force-an-force 
trails of mechanized infantry versus fully modernized armor 
heavy threats in deliberate defense and movement to contact 
missions. Each m~ssion generates data output from multiple 
simulation wi th regard to four of 
effectiveness. These measures of effectiveness include the 
mechanized force I s range of antiarmor engagements, force 
survivability, target stealing by antiarmor weapons, and 
lethality. Data analysis of the output using the 
Mann-Whitney Test is used to compare the operational 
effectiveness of the mechanized infantry with and without 
the Javelin. 
Results of the experimental data analysis indicate that 
the Javelin perfonns superior to the Dragon across all four 
measures of effectiveness. These results support evidence 
that the Javelin equipped mechanized unit has the ability to 
kill enemy forces' from greater distances and with greater 
lethality, while maintaining improved survivability. For 
the military commander, the contributions of the Javelin 
make it possible to improve heavy conventional forces. 
Conclusive evidence suggests that the operational 
effectiveness of the Mechanized Infantry is significantly 
enhanced as a result of replacing the Dragon with the 
Javelin. The characteristics of the Javelin make it a 
favorable alternative for the Dragon. In this study, the 
Javelin proves to be a worthy combat multiplier to the 
Mechanized Infantry's arsenal. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGRO UND 
In recent yea.rs the United States Army has rigorously 
analyzed the events of a changing world order. With the 
Cold War years at an end, democratic nations around the 
world celebrate the freedom from the o v e rbearing impasse of 
a superpowe:t communist threat. Former soviet nations have 
divided, changing their politics and their military 
structure only to make it more difficult for the united 
States to assess their intentions or hosti~ities. Moreover, 
the advances in technology alllong third world nations causes 
more concern each day as their potential for a mid-to-high 
intensity of 'War increases. As a result of the changing 
geo-pol i tical environment and the United States' 
domestic political intolerance for current military end 
strengths, the US Army is transitioning from a forward 
deployed force to a smaller, more rapidly deployable force. 
This force will maintain the goal to assert an overwhelt:ling, 
modernized advantage in strength and firepower in 
contingency operations 'When and 'Wherever necessary. 
Support for such a contingency force must be designed to 
provide critical 'Weapon systems that provide higher force 
surviVability and lethality. The Javelin Antitank Weapon 
System may provide such support. The Javelin currently is 
undergoing the D~partment of Defense I s (DOD) acquisition 
process to enhance the robustness of Light Infantry forces. 
It is intended to be fielded by 1995 in order to replace its 
less effective predecessor, the Dragon [Ref. 1 and Ref. 2]. 
The availabil ity of the Javelin raises a new issue to 
the Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), u nited 
States Army Infantry School (USAIS), and Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The question, "Should the Javelin 
also become part of the anti armor arsenal of the Mechanized 
Infantry?" now must be considered. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As proponents for analysis of new weapon systems, TRADOC 
Analysis Center Research Activities at Monterey, Ca l ifornia 
(TRAC-Monterey) is conducting model research in support of 
initial operational tests and evaluations (IOTE) conducted 
by OPTEC. TRAC-Monterey uses Janus(A) , a high resolution 
combat model as its primary tool to conduct simulations 
research. 
Masters thesi s research [Ref. 3 and Ref. 4) involving 
simUlations and military operational tests analyzing the 
Javelin versus Dr:agon indicate significant differences in 
specific of effectiveness and of 
performance. These models and tests were performed with 
modeling and field exercises with the Light Infantry. The 
methodologies and conclusions of these earlier works provide 
inordinate amounts of practical information that is 
pertinent to this study. In fact, the motivation of thi s 
thesis is that it is follow-on work to both Jayelin; A Case 
St\ldy in Model-Test MQde l by Charles A. Pate (December 1992) 
and Javelin ys Dragon IT · b Cprnparatiye Analysis by Michael 
J. McGuire (September 1993) . 
The initial work by Pate [Ref. 3] addressing the Javelin 
weapon system and modeling- on Janus(A) are the original 
efforts to begin Hodel-Test-Model research for an infantry 
antiarmor weapon system. The Model-Test-Model paradigm is a 
p rocedural analys~s adopted by TRAC-Honterey and other test 
agencies to test, evaluate, and validate the effectiveness 
of new weapon systems. Pate's work in modeling the Javelin 
in Janus(A) involves four combat scenarios. Factors 
involved in these scenarios are modeled to represent the 
conditions of the initial operational tests that 
conducted as part of the Model-Test-Model analysis. 
For a vigorous analysis, Pate's work models scenarios 
wi th and without Mission oriented Protective Posture (HOPP). 
other considerations include size of friendly (blue) forces 
and opposing (red) forces. Pate varies the force strengths 
from a platoon c,?nducting defensive missions to a company 
conducting offensive operations. Due to inSUfficient data 
for Javelin and Dragon night engagements at the time, all of 
Pate's work is limited to scenario modeling in day time 
conditions. The scenarios conducted were hasty defense in 
MOPP-4, deliberate defense, deliberate attack, and movement 
to contact. The first two defensive missions employ a 
platoon size element (30 soldiers). The hasty defense 
mission is conducted in MOPP-4 for the purpose of simulating 
conditions in a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) 
environment. A MOPP level of four in this case is factored 
into Janus (A) modeling to reduce the soldiers effectiveness 
as it 'Would during the actual operational tests conducted by 
OPTEC . The remaining two offensive missions are conducted 
with a strength of a 90 soldier force, representative of a 
typical company size unit. These missions are modeled in an 
NBC free environment. 
opposing forces are typica l in size for missions against 
blue forces. Hence, a company size mechanized unit 
consisting of eight BMPs and three T-72 tanks is paired 
against the blue force platoon. Likewise, a p l atoon size 
red force consisting of two BMPs and two T-72 tanks opposes 
the blue force company element. In all scenarios, the 
simUlations are run until tota l annihi l ation of one force by 
the other or until the offensive unit gains its march 
objective. 
Each simUlation run produces data output as required by 
the measures of effectiveness (HOES). Pate derived these 
HOEs from the Critical operational Issues and Criteria 
(COIC) developed at TEXCOH. The MOEs are categorized into 
three areas, engagement range, lethality, and surviv ability. 
Typically then the data requirements used for the HOEs are, 
respecti vely, average engagement range, number of 
kills/number of shots fired, and number of blue soldiers 
survinging/number of blue soldiers starting. 
Pate applies ~everal analytical tools including pairwise 
comparisons of HOEs and One Way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) . It is important to note that in each case, 
hypothesis testing in ANOVA assumes DOL1TIa l ity. When testing 
proves evidence of normality, Pate the 
Kruskal-Wallis One Way Analysis by Ranks test as a 
nonpararnetric technique for analyzing the collected data. 
This fina l approach provides a less powerful test but still 
offers a robust analysis. 
The findings in Pate's work concludes that in all 
scenarios, the analytical I:\ethods support the alternative 
hypothesis, H" that the Rlean MOE of Dragon does not equal 
the mean HOE for Javelin. Accordingl y, the HOEs for the 
Javelin equipped force proves to be statistically different 
and better than the Dragon equipped force up to a fiVe 
percent level of significance [Ref. 3]. 
Trends to be considered in Pate's analysis become 
evident in the analysis of the lethality HOE . While the 
range of percentages for Javelin's lethality dominated that 
of the Dragon's, in offensive operations these ranges for 
both weapon systems were lower than their respective 
measures of lethality in the defense missions. This can be 
accounted for by the fact that in defensive operations, by 
doctrine, antiarmor weapon systems are employed in such a 
manner as to take full advantage of their engagement ranges. 
This most desirable tactic is not always possible in an 
often unpredictable offensive type mission. 
McGuire [Ref. 4] extends Pate' s work on modeling and 
analyzing the Javelin versus Dragon in Janus (Al • Using a 
similar approach, McGuire investigates six scenarios. These 
scenarios are divided into three defensive and three 
offensive missions. In addition, with new night time data, 
factors systematically varied to represent the 
conditions for both day and night operations. Operations 
considered in his study are the deliberate day and night 
defense, hasty day and night ambush, and finally, deliberate 
day and night attacks. Each scenario is simulated in an NBC 
free environment. McGuire mentions no reason for excluding 
NBC conditions. At the time however, an assumption may have 
been drawn from Pate's conclUsions that regardless of NBC 
conditions, Javelin equipped scenarios are significantly 
different then the alternatively equipped Dragon scenarios. 
The size of blue and red forces are identical to Pate's 
scenarios with regards to mission types. As an exception, 
MCGuire adds attack helicopters to red forces and two 
tubularly l aunched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) 
antiarmor missiles to blue forces as a supplemental weapon 
system to each deliberate defense mission and the hasty 
night ambush. During each run, the TOW missiles engage and 
destroy the attack helicopters. Due to the unrealistic 
result, it is determined that helicopters should not be used 
in any scenarios involving TOW missiles. 
The design of McGuire r s experiment, a completely 
randomized ~ design, is treated simply as a completely 
randomized design. For each scenario three trained army 
officers are used to run the simulations. The assumption 
McGuire makes is that the individuals cause no blocking 
effects on the analysis. Given that, McGuire varies the 
scenarios by the six levels of missions and by two levels of 
weapon types, Javelin and Dragon. 
MCGuire's results in pairwise comparisons of MOE data 
are similar to Pate's findings. Likewise, the MOE data 
requirements are categorized in the areas of range, 
lethality, and survivability. Failing normality, the ANOVA 
approach similarly proves fruitless for McGuire as did the 
Shipiro-wilkes tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for typical 
hypothesis testing. Realizing the nonparametric structure 
of the data, McGuire analyzes the MOEs using the Mann 
Whitney test. McGuire also concludes that for most 
scenarios there is a significant difference shown between 
Javel in and Dragon. Under the category for lethal i ty, 
McGuire discovers that the most meaningful HOEs are loss 
exchange ratios (LERs) , force exchange ratios (FERs), and 
the ratio of threat vehicles killed by Dragon or Javelin 
divided by the total number of shots by Dragon or Javelin. 
In any case, the conclusive analysis indicates that for 
these three MOEs, the Javelin proves significantly different 
than the Dragon in lethality. There is however one 
exception to this result for HOEs, LER and FER, in the 
deliberate d ay attack scenario. McGuire offers several 
First, the support by fire position for both the 
Javelin and Dragon are within 1000 meters of the objective. 
This short distance fails to provide a standoff distance 
safely away from red force engagements. Secondly, the 
terrain in the Janus{A) database may influence the operators 
to assess that there is less cover and concealment than 
there is actually on the corresponding piece of terrain at 
Fort Hunter Liggett, thus, providing an unexpected longer 
survivability time for both weapons and allowing more time 
to inflict heavier losses to the red forces. 
McGuire addresses survivability using two measures of 
effectiveness, unit survivability and weapon survivability 
for both Dragon and Javelin. Unit survivability measures 
how many blue soldiers survived relative to how many began 
the battle. Likewise, weapon survivability for Dragon and 
Javelin measures the number of respective gunners surviving 
relative to their starting number. McGuire's results concur 
with Pate's with regard to the two missions: movement to 
contact (resulting into a hasty day ambush in McGuire's 
work) and the deliberate defense. These mission pairs show 
significant differences between Javelin and Dragon. On the 
other hand, McGuire's deliberate day attack mission 
indicates no differences between either weapon system and in 
essence contradicts Pate's results for the same mission 
type. Similar reasons to explain this phenomena are 
characterized by those noted earlier for the discrepancies 
in the LER and FER results. The rational for the outcome is 
an observed inverse relationship between survivability and 
unit loss. 
McGuire and Pate made an important contribution to the 
TOTE of the Javelin weapon system at Fort Hunter Liggett in 
early spring of 1994. Their findings aided in streamlining 
the design of the operational tests conducted as part of the 
Model-Test-Hodel research of the Javelin weapon system. The 
recommendations from both studies indicate that different 
pairs of missions of the same nature, offensive or 
defensive, need not necessarily be perfonned so that 
operational tests can be tapered to make efficient use of 
resources and still provide sufficient amounts of real data. 
Knowledge of these particularly redundant scenarios helps 
omit them from Ci.ny follow-on operational tests. This 
precious and attempts to avoid 
conducting statistically unproductive field tests. [Ref. 4] 
C. PROBLEM STATEl\1ENT 
Successful operational and live fire tests have proven 
the Javelin superior to the Dragon. Unfortunately, limited 
resources have restricted operational testing of light or 
dismounted infantry forces scenarios. The Army needs to 
know if the Javelin should be fielded in mechanized units. 
The mechanized units today maintain a robust inventory of 
millions of dol lars worth of extremely technical equipment. 
New and advanced weapon systems also corne with a high price 
tag therefore, the cost of the system must be weighed 
against its contributions to operational effectiveness. As 
a proposal, modeling and simUlations will be used to address 
this question as the Army has allotted no resources for 
additional operational tests and evaluations involving heavy 
forces scenarios. 
D. SCOPE 
As resources continue to diminish, acquisition of 
advanced weapon systems like the Javelin will become 
increasingly more· difficult if not impossible without prior 
analysis of each new system's developmental and operational 
performances. Integrating the Javelin into the infantry's 
10 
weapons inventory could be costly and unnecessary or it may 
be a beneficial and worthy combat multiplier. The scope of 
this thesis is to further explore the utility of the Javelin 
for the Army in ,the interest of potentially fielding the 
weapon system to the Mechanized Infantry. 
This thesis investigates the contributions of the 
Javelin for the Mechanized Infantry using modeling in 
Janus CAl to determine if the system proves to enhance combat 
operational effectiveness. The scenarios used in Janus (Al 
reflect combat operations developed by applying current 
tactics and doctrine for the light (dismounted) and 
mechanized infantry platoon/company size forces. operations 
selected for study in the Janus (Al mechanized scenarios are 
based on input from prior research and requirements for 
analysis by the host agency, TRAC-Monterey. Additionally, 
these scenarios are analyzed in tenns of measures of 
effectiveness selected by the author and TRAC-Monterey. 
Graphical and statistical data analysis is applied to 
detennine the operational effectiveness of the mechanized 
infantry in cases modeled with and without the Javelin as a 
replacement for the Dragon in the antiannor role. The 
results from this analysis will directly aid in the decision 
of where to field the Javelin for the futUre, smaller, and 
more elite US Army. 
11 
12 
II. EQUIPMENT AND SCE~ARJO DESCRIPll0~S 
This chapter serves to describe the differences in 
weapon systems, friendly and enemy forces, and their 
capabilities as they impact upon the mechanized infantry 
unit. Moreover, the employment of the Dragon and Javelin is 
discussed as appropriate to each type of scenario, be it 
offensive or defensive. These descriptions provide a basic 
knowledge from which to understand holo' mechanized infantry 
fight. Gaining an understanding of these tactics makes it 
clearer on how to ilnplement the systems into Janus (A) 
model lng. Furthennore. a sound knowledge of equipment and 
tactics aids in comparing and contrasting the systems in 
question. This understanding helps establish and validate 
meaningful results of the MOEs in the design of the 
experiment. 
A. A:'IJTlARMOR WEAPON SYSTEMS 
1. Dragon 
The Dragon is the primary antiarmor weapon system for 
the dismounted element of the mechanized platoon and 
company. The major components of the weapon are the day 
sight, attachable thermal night sight, and a single missile. 
Although the day and night sights are reusable, the cost for 
each Dragon missile is an estimated $25,000 dollars. The 
combined weight of the system is approximately 55 pounds. 
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Al though it is manportable, the bulky size and weight of the 
Dragon make maneuvers and speed of movement difficult. 
To fire the Dragon, the gunner steadies his aim using 
the bipod stand and firm ground. When engaged, the gunner 
ensures that the missile has a direct line-of-fire to reach 
its target. Figure 1 shows the Dragon gunner in the sitting 
firing position. 
Figure 1. Dragon gunner employed in firing position. 
The Dragon engages light skinned and heavy armored 
vehicles up to a range of 1000 meters. Most enemy weapon 
systems of machine-gun caliber and higher are more than 
capable of engaging and returning fire to the Dragon gunner 
at these distances . As a result, employing the Dragon 
potentially exposes the gunner to threatening enemy fires 
because of its lack of standoff in range. Additionally, the 
14 
muzzle flash and smoke from the missile's launch compromises 
the location and inevitably the survivability of the Dragon 
gunner. [Ref. 5] 
Range standoff is not the only shortfall of the Dragon 
system. The Dragon is a command-linked wire guided missi l e 
with a relatively slow velocity. As a consequence, the 
gunner may remain exposed for as much as 10 to 12 seconds 
because of the extensive tracking time of the missile until 
target impact. 
2. Javelin 
The Javelin Antitank Weapon System is also a manportable 
system. It has been suggested to replace, one-for-one, the 
Dragon in the antiarmor role for dismounted infantry. The 
Javelin is designed to weigh five to six pounds less than 
the Dragon, but it too is large and difficult to carry in 
the field. The system includes two major components: a 
reusable command and launch unit (CLU) and the warhead 
itself which is a missile packaged in a sealed tube. 
Although currently not in full scale production, the Javelin 
missile itself costs an estimated $100, 000 dollars, 
approximately four times that of the Dragon. The CLU has an 
integrated day/night sight which provides target acquisition 
even in adverse weather conditions. As an added benefit, 
the CLU may also be used independently as another means of 
target acquisition on the battlefield. The Javelin has an 
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increased engagement range of 2000 meters and a detection 
range out to 4500 meters. Technically and tactically, the 
key advantage of the Javelin is its fire-and-forget 
capability. This allows the gunner to quickly locate the 
target, lock on the missile, engage and seek cover 
immediately upon missile launch. Another feature of the 
Javelin is the gunner's selection of modes of target 
engagement. The two modes of fire are top attack mode, which 
shoots a high trajectory, and a flat traj ectory or direct 
line of sight fire mode. The gunner selects the top attack 
mode to engage enemy tanks and vehicles at greater 
distances. This allows for the missile to impact the top of 
the target vehicle where it is less heavily armored and more 
vulnerable to catastrophic kills. When overhead cover 
obstructs the indirect flight path of the missile, the 
gunner selects the direct fire mode. Figure 2 illustrates 
the Javelin ready to fire in the top attack mode from a 
kneeling position. Also, the Javelin uses a soft launch 
feature which allows it to be fired from enclosures and 
covered fighting positions and helps reduce the launch 
signature of the gunner. [Ref. 6] 
3. Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) 
The BFV came to the Mechanized Infantry out of 
necessity. The advances in technology developing the M~Al 
Abram Tank left the Mechanized Infantry behind in firepower 
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and speed. The effect made it difficult for the Infantry to 
provide mutual combined arms support on the battlefield. 
The BFV closes this gap, giving the Infantry the tools to 
succeed in their mission to close with and destroy the enemy 
in a combined arms battle. 
Figure 2. From (Ref. 2], Javelin gunner in open position. 
The BFV has the capacity to carry a nine man squad 
within excellent armor protection. Three crew members 
operate the vehicle and its mounted armament. The fire team 
(dismounted) element rides in the rear troop compartment and 
is able to mount or dismount the vehicle through the ramp 
access door or when the ramp is down. Figure 3 illustrates 
the ramp down dismount of the BFV in a typical operation. 
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One of the most important features is the cOlT,pliment of 
weapon systems onboard the BFV. The vehicle's main weapon 
is the M242 25-millimeter fully automatic gun. The M242 has 
three rates of fi~e: single shot, low rate, and high rate. 
It can deliver arIllor piercing rounds against lightly armored 
vehicles to a maximum effective range of 1700 meters. 
Adjacent to the M242 is the M240 7. 62-millimeter coaxially 
mounted machine gun. The M240 is used to suppress and 
defeat enemy dismounted forces out to a range of 900 meters. 
The BFV' s main anti tank weapon is the turret mounted TOW. 
The TOW missile is the optically tracked, wire guided 
missile with accuracy from 65 to 3750 meters. The TOW 
launcher can load two missiles but fire s sequentially. 
Internal storage of the 8FV can hold five extra TOW or 
Dragon/Javelin rounds or a mix. [Ref. 7 ] 
Figure 3. Dismounting the BFV with ramp down. 
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B. SCENARIOS 
Regardless of infantry unit' 5 organizational 
equ i pment, the basic tactics are similar. In particular, 
the doctr i nal empl oyment of either the Dragon or the Javelin 
in a mechanized infantry unit is identical to that of a 
l ight infantry unit. In any case, the commander and platoon 
leader must consiger the employment of both weapon systems. 
Each system' 5 employment is dependent upon the type of 
mission. TIo'o missiCJns designed and simulated for this study 
are the deliberate defense a nd' t h e -moveJllent to contact. 
These missions encompass b oth defensive and offensive 
tactics and maneuvers. 
The main purpose of the movement t o contact is to 
establish o r regain c ontact wit h the enemy . As wi th any 
offensive operation, it i s the intent of the commander to 
develop the situation, gain the tactical advantage, and then 
close with and destroy or neutralize his opponent. Because 
the movement to contact may often expose the attacking 
forces, it is doctrinal for the commander to establish 
locally superior combat power in forces and equipment. 
Conversely, the role of the deliberate defense is to defeat 
an enemy attack. By doctrine, it is not the intent to 
defend in place but rather to defend only until sufficient 
strength a110...,s one to counterattack and return to the 
offensive. Generally, commanders use the deliberate defense 
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to buy time, impede enemy forces while other friendly forces 
may attack, conserve forces, and hol d key terrain that pos e s 
an advantage to its occupants. [Ref. 8] 
The different nature of these operations offer a unique 
look at both weapon systems engag ed in two extrer.tely 
different scenarios. These missions wil l also deliver a 
comparatively robust analysis of the unit's effectiveness in 
ei ther case . A comparison of results from these operations 
to those of Pate and McGuire may also provide supportive 
evidenc e to the Javelin's potential. 
Prior to disc~ssing the employment of the key antiarmor 
weapon systems in either types of missions, it is best to 
understand the organization of the mechan i zed infantry and 
opposing threat forces. The forces modeled are the 
mechanized infantr y platoon and company employed in the 
deliberate defense and movement to contact, respectively. 
Threat forc es consist of a mix of tanks, T-72s, and 
personnel carriers, BMP-2s with dismounting infantry. Both 
friendly and threat forces have the capability to fight 
their soldiers mounted or dismounted as the situation of the 
battle and terrain dictates. The friendly forces represent 
the quantity of· soldiers, weapons, and equipment that are 
currently found in the US Army Modified Table of 
Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for each size unit. 
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Likewise, the threat forces are organized and equipped as 
typ ical of any fonner Soviet/Warsaw Pact force. 
1. Friendly Forces:. Mechanized 
a. Organi:.ntion and Equipment 
At its basic level, the mechanized infantry company 
consists of three platoons of four BFVs each and a company 
headquarters. The company headquarters also has a BFV which 
is manned by the commander, master gunner, driver, and the 
fire support officer. The platoons operate under the 
direction and guidance of the commander but to the orders of 
the p l atoon leader and platoon sergeant. The decentralized 
control allows the platoons to fight rapidl y in a variety of 
situations requiring mounted and dismounted tact i cs. Each 
platoon has two' sections, A and B, with two BFVs per 
section. sections A and B consist of two squads of nine 
Each squad has three crew members and six members of a 
fire team . On order, each squad's fire team dismounts to 
fonn the ground maneuver e l ement. During sustained 
d i smounted operations, the ground maneuver element is 
commanded by the platoon leader. Meanwhile, the platoon 
sergeant controls the movement of the BFVs and provides fire 
support to the dismounted portion of the platoon. [Ref. 7 J 
Weapon systems organic to the mechanized platoon 
enable it to mass a wide variety of both small anns and 
antiarmor fires. Complimenting the BFV's weapon systems, 
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the dismounted fire teams each typically have the antiarn.or 
specialist, two automatic riflemen, and three riflemen. The 
platoon thus has a composite list of the following key 
anti armor systems and weapons. 
1. 4 BFVs with coaxial machine guns. 
4 X 7 TOW missiles (basic load). 
4 X 1 M242 .25 millimeter automatic guns . 
2. 4 Antiarmor specialist. 
4 X 2 Dragon/Javelin missiles (Movement to contact) 
or 4 X 4 Dragon/Javel.in lllissiles (Deliberate 
Defense) • 
Assuming time permitting, the Dragon/Javelin gunners 
have an additional two missiles per system for the 
deliberate defense mission. The remaining weapon systems 
are small arms. These include the Ml6A2 rifles and the M249 
Squad Automatic Weapons (SAWs) which are individually 
assigned and carried by certain soldiers in the platoon. 
b. Tactics of the Antiarmor fight 
Tactics, t~chniques, and procedures for employing 
anti armor weapon systems are as much a commander' s 
prerogative as they are a science. There are however, some 
basic doctrinal and tactical principles that should be 
observed. Based on the estimate of the situation, the 
commander decides where to position the anti armor weapons. 
Ideally, he places the weapon systems in such a manner as to 
take full advantage of each system's range and capabilities. 
The commander, guided by experience and doctrine, balances 
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his decision 'With information about the mission, enemy, 
terrain, available troops and time (METT-T). 
During the estimate of the situation, the commander 
has more time to plan the positioning of his antiarmor 
assets in the del iberate defense than in the movement to 
contact. Once the battle begins, the conduct of the 
antiarmor fight in the movement to contact relies heavily on 
the commander's intent and guidance, given prior to the 
mission, and the resulting actions of the anti armor 
specialist. Nevertheless, the commander's concerns for the 
employment of antiarrnor 'Weapon sys.tems in the offense are 
the same as those measures he appl ies in the defense. 
In defensive operations, particularly the deliberate 
defense, the cOInJllander's goal is to array his antiarmor 
'Weapons such that their fields of fire are directed 
primarily at the enemy's flanks and rear. By design, 
armored vehicles are more vulnerable 'When exposed to flank 
and rear shots. The effectiveness of TOW and Dragon fires 
are greatly reduced against the more heavily shrouded 
frontal slope of armor vehicles . In these instances, the 
Javelin weapon syptem has the advantage to fire indirectly 
at oncoming targets as a top attack weapon. 
Antiarmor engagements require clear fields of fire. 
80th the TOW and Dragon 'Weapon systems cannot have 
obstructions in the flight paths of the missi l es . Any large 
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obstacles may damage the guide wires and prevent the 
missiles from engaging their target. This includes large 
bodies of water that potentially cause electrical failure of 
the guide wires that trail the missile's flight. 
The position of antiarnor weapons should provide 
mutually supportive and interlocking fires. The TOW 
engagements although capable of 3750 meters, cannot be 
supported beyond 2000 meters by either the Javelin or the 
Dragon. Employment of each system must consider the 
synergistic effect that occurs when integrating all 
antiarnor fires to one engagement area. In the defense, the 
commander designates this engagement area with trigger lines 
which span the range of all weapon systems. Once in the 
engagement area, enemy targets are destroyed in mass by 
cross coverage of fire from all weapons. 
In the movement to contact, the antiarnor weapons 
generally play a supportive, overwatching role for the 
maneuvering units. Antiarnor weapons must be able to place 
fires rapidly to cover the flanks and prevent enemy forces 
from reinforcing the objective or counter-attacking the main 
body of the maneuvering units. The tactics to employ the 
antiarmor weapons are similar to the defense but, when the 
mission occurs, there is less time to establ ish engagement 
areas with interlocking fires. 
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2. Enemy Forces· Mechanized/Armor Heavy 
tL Organizntion and Equipment 
Enemy soldiers and equipment are representative of a 
mechanized/heavy force similar to the former soviet/warsaw 
Pact. Weapons capabilities and acquisition devices of the 
tanks and armored vehicles are upgraded to provide a 
contel!lporary study against a more modernized opponent. Day 
and night vision devices are modeled as having the same 
capabilities as current US fOIces. Also, enemy SIna11 arms 
weapons are considered equivalent in firepower and lethality 
against friendly forces weapons of the same ca'liber. 
In both missions, the opposing forces portray a T-72 
tank company task organized with one mechanized platoon with 
three BMP-2's and 11 man squads each. The tank company is 
composed of three platoons and one headquarters section. 
Each platoon has three tanks. Including the cOll\lllander, the 
company maintains' ten tanr..s with the 120 millimeter smooth 
bore main gun. The T-72 tank's main gun has an effective 
range out to 2000 meters. The range and high explosive 
antitank rounds make the T-72 a significant threat to the 
BPV. 
The BMP-2 is a light armored personnel carrier. Its 
main weapon systems include a 3D-millimeter cannon and an 
AT-5 spandrel. Respectively, these weapon systems are 
capable of suppressing and inflicting damage on the BFV at 
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close ranges within 1000 meters with small arms fire and out 
to 3000 meters with antiarmor missile fires. As an 
advantage, the BMP-2 's low profile and speed make it a 
difficult target. 
h. Tactics and Doctrine 
The essence of speed dictates that the enemy forces 
prefer to remain in a column or march formation. Generally, 
the tank company is the lead element. once battle is 
eminent, the tank. company and its mechanized platoon deploy 
laterally on line with its platoons in column. This is 
doctrinally referred to as the prebattle formation. 
IIl\JlIediately before cOIr.bat, the company further disperses 
into an attack formation with platoons on line or in wedge 
formation. Once within small arms range of the objective, 
the infantry squads dismount the BMP-2s and begin to conduct 
a close combat assault. As a unit, the BMP-2s will support 
their dismounts as they try to fire and maneuver toward 
their objective in order to disrupt, expose, and break 
through any weakness in the opposing defense. The strict 
discipline in formations emphasizes swift and efficient 
movement. This achieves a concentrated effort to punch 
through front line defenses and shatter an opposing weaker 
rear objective. If successful, lead units break through and 
create a safe passage for follow-on forces. [Ref. 9] 
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A defense p o sture is assumed when enemy forces cannot 
continue on the o'ffensive. The defense is considered only 
temporary unt i l additional resources allow the offense to 
continue. When it becomes inevitable to defend, the 
platoons create strongpoin ts with squads and vehicles 
d i spersed in V-type wedge formations. Making use of the 
terrain, the defensive positions focus on canalizing the 
attackers into fire sacks which are covered by all organic 
weapons of the platoons and company. 
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m. EXPERThIENTAL DESIGN 
A. JANUS(A) AS A IIlGH RESOLUTION COMBAT MODEL 
I. The Model 
Janus{A) is a stochastic, interactive, high resolution 
land combat computer model. Multipl e p l ayers can utilize it 
simul taneously as a training tool for tactics and combined 
arms wa rfare. More importantly, to t he analyst, Janus(A) 
provides a method of generating multiple simulation runs and 
output data that model combined arms warfare. Interactions 
between opposing mode l ed forces apply stochasti c processes 
in detection, acqu i sition. and engagement algorithms, giving 
t h e model a realistic ability in determining kills. 
Janus (A) is one of the primary high resolution mode l s for 
the US Army and has gained acceptanc e by the other Armed 
services. 
Janus{A) can be designed to model realism through 
several variable factors. Weapon systems and terrain are 
two of the most influential of these factors. These factors 
can randomly and systemical ly affect the events of any 
scenario. other factors such as weather, chemical 
environment, mi nes, and smoke add even more realism when 
brought into play. As a high resolution model, Janus{A) 
simulates both friendly and enemy units, weapons, and 
equipment as they are affected by these factors. As a 
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point, successful missions accomplished in Janus(A) take 
into consideration the effects of these factors and 
condi tions. 
The engagements in Janus(A) are calculated and resolved 
by detection, a~quisition and engagement algorithms of 
.... eapon systems. An engagement occurs only .... hen an element 
of a force is .... ithin line of sight and range of an opposing 
.... eapon system. With the exception of arti l lery fires, all 
engagements are direct fire exchanges. The direct fire 
exchange is a limitation which directly affects the accuracy 
in modeling the Javelin's top attack capability. As a 
result, all Javelin fires are simulated in Janus (A) as 
direct fires upon the frontal slopes or flanks of targets. 
The outcome from each engagement is e ither a miss or 
catastrophic kill. The probability of hit, Ph, and 
probability of kill, Pk, data utilized by Janus(A) are 
developed through tests and studies done by the Army 
Material Systems Analysis Agency (AY.SM) and its affiliated 
agencies. These data, unclassified and classified, are 
inputs for numerous systems including typical NATO and 
former Soviet/Warsaw Pact .... eapons. conducting Janus (A) 
simUlations with this database allows for extensive data 
collection on .... eapon engagements and system detections by 




Terrain files in Janus(A) are derived primarily from the 
Defense Mapping Agency data. These are digitized images of 
selected areas that are imported into scenarios built by the 
modeler. The images graphically illustrate vegetation, road 
networks, urban areas, elevation and contour lines. The 
terrain in Janus(Al version 3.l.7 has 50 meter resolution and 
can be displayed. with grid designations that accurately 
represent the area of operations that correspond to the 
actual military map. [Ref. l.0] 
All scenarios in this analysis are developed using the 
terrain map of Fort Hunter Liggett, California. The 
location was selected because it offers a wide variety of 
terrain such as hills, valleys, open areas and a mix of low 
to thick vegetation. The efficacy of Janus (Al to 
incorporate the terrain increases the realistic 
representation of the scenarios. The effects of terrain 
impact upon combat operation in such areas as weapons 
engagements, line of sight, and rates of movement. 
3. AUTOJAN 
Janus(Al has the capability to create mUltiple 
simUlation runs with independent results using the AUTOJAN 
mode. To operate in this mode requires a previously 
recorded run of an original simUlation which has been 
performed interactively. the original simUlation is 
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recorded, the AUTOJAN feature calls upon the record for the 
history of all weapon systems movement routes, engagement 
postures, and fields of view. Independent trials of the 
same mission are repeated in AUTOJAN by randomizing the seed 
used by the detection, acquisition, and engagement 
algorithms. Each repeated 1 ikewise provides 
postprocessed information of the results. [Ref. 10] 
The AUTOJAN feature does, however, restrict the use of 
the mount/dismount capabilities of an interactively played 
scenario. In the original simulation, mounted forces must 
be dismounted immediately prior to contact with opposing 
forces. This allow each dismounted element to have separate 
movement routes, engagement postures" and fields of view 
before its carrier vehicle is possibly eliminated by a 
catastrophic kill. In the AUTOJAN run, the carrier may not 
become a catastrophic kill, in which case, all techniques 
and movement histories applied to the dismounted forces are 
still a part of the original record. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. General 
The Mechanized Infantry model testing is varied across 
two types of missions and the two weapon types, Dragon and 
Javelin. Each scenario test includes eleven runs of each 
mission per weapon type. The del iberate defense and the 
movement to contact missions are both iterated using the 
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AUTOJAN replay feature. After each run, data is 
postprocessed, collected, and then transferred onto a 
spreadsheet for further anal ysis. At this point, hypothesis 
testing is conducted for each MOE to investigate signs of 
significant differences caused by the effects of the two 
anti armor weapons systems. 
2. Assumptions 
Typical hypothesis testing using parametric techniques 
assumes, for example in a t-test when comparing two means, 
both populations normally distributed and their 
variances are equal. Common parametric techniques rely on 
this assumption. It is, however, not unco=on for data not 
to follow these assumptions and to bring the Validity of the 
parametric procedure into question. In order to circumvent 
this difficulty, nonparametric statistical procedures may be 
used. Mendenhall states: 
Research has shown that nonparametric 
statistical tests are almost as capable of detecting 
differences among populations as the parametric 
methods (of preceding chapters) when normality and 
other assumptions are satisfied. They may be, and 
often are, more powerful in detecting popUlation 
d i fferences when the assumptions are not satisfied. 
For this reason many statisticians advocate the use 
of nonparametric statistical procedures in 
preference to ·their parametric counterparts. [Ref . 11] 
The statistical analysis of Pate and McGuire indicates 
that the output froJ:l the Light Infantry simUlation runs is 
not entirely normally distributed. From these findings, it 
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is assumed that the output from the mechanized forces 
scenarios will not necessarily provide evidence of normally 
distributed samples of data. It is, however, assumed that 
the data are independent random samples from two populations 
wi th the same shape and a scale that is ordinal. On this 
assumption, it is reasonable to hypothesize that there may 
exist a shift in 'lIIedians between these two populations. It 
is acceptable then to choose the Mann-Whitney test [Ref.ll]. 
The Mann-Whitney test provides a nonparametric method to 
test for significant differences between two populations 
medians of unknown distributions. 
3. Mann-Whitney Nonparametric Test 
Results of each mission are evaluated using quantifiable 
measures of effectiveness_ The basic analytical objective 
is to determine if the proposed scenarios reveal a 
difference between the two mechanized unit configurations. 
Hypothesis testing under the Mann-whitney approach involves 
pairwise comparisons between the medians of each MOE for 
each different type of mechanized unit. 
The Mann-Whitney method first involves ranking together 
the two samples of data from each MOE. Smallest 
observations are given rank 1, second smallest, rank 2, 
etc., until all observations are ranked. Observations that 
are tied are each assigned the average rank order. The sum 
of the ranks of the first sample are calculated and labeled 
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the test statistic, W. Small values for the test statistic, 
W, indicate that the median for the first sample is smaller 
than the median of the second sample. Conversely, large 
val ues of W indicate that the median for the second sample 
is smaller than the first. [Ref. 12] 
In each scenario, the Mann-Whitney tests will be: 
H O :T]J=T]l, 
Where: 
1] I = the median of each MOE in an applied Dragon scenario i, 
112 == the median oreach MOE in an applied Javelin scenario i, 
for i '" 1 to 2 (deliberate defense, movement to contact) 
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) 
The purpose of an MOE is to capture a specific data 
e l ement that best investigates the operational effectiveness 
of the Dragon and Javelin equipped mechanized scenarios. 
The HOEs considered in this study are characteristic of the 
HOEs required by the Critical operational Issues and 
criteria (COIC) developed by OPTEC. The critical issues and 
their required data elements can be found explicitly in the 
Test and Evaluation Plan (TEP) that was used for the rOTE of 
the Javelin for Light Infantry [Ref. 13]. Using this as a 
guide, the HOEs established for this study investigate four 
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areas: range, survivability, dominating antiannor systems, 
and lethality. In detail, these HOEs are as follows: 
MOE for range of engagement per unit type. 
Data element: Antiarmor engagement range of eaeh type unit. 
2. MOE for force survivability. 
Data element: number ofblueforees survived. 
number of blue forces starting 
3. MOE for target stolen by antiannor system. 
Data element: # o~t~t~::~~:::e~:~:~;~::d~~a~n:;;lill . 
4. MOE for lethality (force exchange ratio). 
Data element: B~~:::S~:;'J::;;':,~[;~::s 
These MOEs are selected because they compare and 
contrast the issues of whether or not the Javelin enhances 
the operational effectiveness of the Mechanized Infantry. 
All MOEs are quantifiable in terms of numeric values 
ratios obtained from each simulation run's output. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
For simplici ty, Janus(A) references missions 
numerically. The mission numbers used as labels in graphs 
in this chapter are listed in Table 1. For each unit type 
there are 11 runs conducted for every mission. This 
includes one original human interactive run and ten AUTOJAN 
Col~ectively, the ten AUTOJAN runs save 60 man hours 
of computer simulation time when each mission averages one 











Movement to Conlacl 
I Unit Type 
Mechanized Platoon with Dragon 
Mechanized Platoon with Javelin 
Mechanized Company with Dragon 
Mechanized Company with Javelin 
Table 1. Numer.1c ass.1gnment of Janus (Al 
A. ANTIARl\IOR I:NGAGE1"lENTS 
The box plot analysis of the antiarmor engagement ranges 
illustrated in FigUre -4 indicates that there is a slight 
difference in the median ranges between unit types for the 
defensive mission. The reason for this resul t is that the 
employnlent of the Javelin is similar to the Dragon due to 
the restrictive nature of the Fort Hunter Liggett terrain. 
As a consequence, the defense missions 500/501 are developed 
with the intent to draw the threat vehicles into an 
engagement area 500 to 1500 meters in depth. The small 
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differences in engagement ranges is also explained by the 
number of TOW missile fires that tend to raise the averages 
of the unit's range of antiarmor engagements. The effect of 
the TOW missiles in raising the averages is also noticeab l e 
in the movement to contact mission. This is particularly 
due to the significant increase in the number of TOW 
missiles. The basic load for missions 500/501 requires a 
mix of 16 Dragon/Javelin missiles and 28 TOW missiles. On 
the other hand, the basic load for missions 525/526 requires 
a mix of 24 Dragon/Javelin missiles and 84 TOW missiles. 
Antiarmor Engagements 
~OOI~O l • :>o llhocat . ""'_n.. ~.~/~.( . __ nt ,,, ",",,, <"01. 
Figure 4. Box plot diagram of antiarmor engagements. 
Note: Engagements include mix of Dragon/Javelin and TOW. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Mann-Whitney tests 
for mission pairs 500/501 and 525/526. Despite the slight 
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similarities in medians for the defensive mi ssions, at the 
0.05 significance level, the null hypothesis that the median 
range of engagements are equal is rejected . 
Missions Pa irs Median Test Statistic, W P-Value 
500 
.' 
1.2340 , 91.0 0.0215 I 
501 1.3408 
I 525 I 2.1720 I 74.0 0.0006 _l 526 2.4793 
Table 2. Mann Whl.tney test for antiarmor engagements. 
B. SUR\'IV ABILJTY 
survivability shows significant differences 
between unit types. In the most significant case, the 
Javelin equipped unit achieves an S5% survivability rate in 
the deliberate defense. The Dragon equipped unit, on the 
other hand, suffers the l oss of almost hal f of its force. 
In both missions, the level of unit survivabili t y is due 
primarily to the dismounted Jav elin gunner. Given an 
armored threat, the Javelin gunner is difficult to detect. 
As a result, Javelin gunners survive longer and cont i nue to 
inflict heavy losses on opposing forces. 
The significant differences are illustrated in Figure 5. 
For each mission pair box p l ots s upport rejection of the 
null hypothesis by showing no overlapping distributions. 
Accordingly, Mann-Whitney test results in Table 3 clearly 
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indicate a significant difference between Dragon and Javelin 
equipped units. 





Figure 5. Box p l ot diagram of blue force survivability. 
Missions Pairs Median Test Statistic, W P-Value 
500 0.5750 85.0 0.0071 I 501 0.8500 
525 0 .6143 82.0 0,0039 I 
526 0.7286 
-
Table 3. Mann Wh~tney test for blue force surv~vab~l~ty. 
C. TARGET STEALING 
The high survivability of the Javelin gunner contributes 
to an unexpected rise in the number of Javelin versus TOW 
kills in both missions 501 and 526. It also explains how 
the medians of each mission with the same antiarmor weapon 
systems are near equal. The Javelin .... ith its increased Ph 
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and Pk capability is a highly effective and dominating 
antiarmor system on the modeled battlefield. Figure 6 
illustrates the difference in the medians of target stealing 
between weapon systems. In both missions, the results 
demonstrate a relatively higher median of Javelin/BFV kills 
than Dragon/BFV ~ills. The results in Table 4 similarly 
indicate that there is a significant difference in the 
mission pairs. Mann-Whitney tests estimate that in both 
cases there is less than a two percent chance of committing 
a type I error in rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Target Stealing 
Missions 
Figure 6. Box plot diagram of armor target stealing. 
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Missions Pairs Median Test Statistic, W P-Value 
500 0.3333 71.5 I 0.0003 501 1.3333 
525 0.5000 90.5 I 0.0197 526 1.1667 
Table 4. Mann Wh~tney test for target steall.ng. 
D. LETHALlTI' 
The analysis of missions 500/501 and 525/526 indicates 
that the medians of lethality are also significantly 
different between each unit type. Notably, the nUmber of 
enemy forces destroyed in the deliberate defense with the 
Javelin significantly out number those with the Dragon. 
This is evident in the graphical comparison of the force 
exchange ratios depicted in Figure 7. As another point, 
similarities in results of each mission with Dragon indicate 
that there is only a linear increase in the force exchange 
ratio between unit types. Hence, a blue force with Dragon 
does not demonstrate an increase in lethality as it gains an 
increase in the number of Dragons. 
Of the MOEs, lethality is the strongest indicator of a 
difference between blue forces with Javelin and blUe forces 
with Dragon. Results of the Mann-Whitney tests in Table 5 
show expected significant differences between medians. More 
importantly, the test indicates a relatiVely small level in 
P-values in rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. 
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Lethality 
~OOI~~1 - D<>l ib(,rM Q D<!~no.. 52~1~16 - Job .. ,,,, ", '0 Con'",,' 
" . ~ : l' ef ~ 2 T g 
Missions 
Comparison of ~[)E 4. for ... acb rr.:l.ssio";U1it tyoo 
Figure 7. Box plot diagram of blue force lethality. 
Missions Pairs Median Test Statistic, W P-Value 
I 500 I 1.7600 
79.5 0.0023 
I 501 5,7020 
I 525 I 1.6780 79.0 0,0020 I 526 3.1 510 
Table 5. Mann Wh~tney test for lethal~ty. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
potential of the Javelin Antitank Weapon System in a 
mechanized environment, it a l so i l l u strates the utility of 
Janu s (Al model research for the US Anny. Use of Janus (Al 
can support the research of past and present tactics and 
weapon systems design. Janus (A) may also be utilized to 
study the development of future tactics and weapon systems 
design. Janus(A) used in support of the test and evaluation 
process may also conserve resources. 
This thesis examines two typical missions of the 
Mechanized Infantry. The actua l field execution of the 
deliberate defense and movement to contact in an operational 
test requires months of effort just i n the planning and 
preparation phase. During the execution of these missions, 
data collection in mos t cases is difficult. In comparison, 
Janus (A) simulations provide multiple executions of these 
missions in hours with accurate results from each employed 
weapon system. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis shows that the operational effectiveness of 
the mec hanized infantry is enhanced when fielded with the 
Javel i n. Examination of the two proposed missions provides 
sufficient and conc lusive evidence for significant 
differences between the unit types with Dragon versus 
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Javelin antiarmor weapons. Our results agree with those of 
Pate and McGuire. A summary of findings may be found in 
Table 6. 
In both scenarios, the Javelin equipped Mechanized 
Infantry prove to be superior to the current Mechanized MTOE 
with Dragon with respect to antiarmor engagement range, blue 
force survivability, target stealing, and lethality. These 
four MOEs are statistically different to less than a five 
percent level of ~ignificance. 
Mission: Deliberate Mission: Movement to 
Defense contact 
Pairs: 500/501 Pairs: 525/526 
I P-value Does Javelin Does Javelin MOE cause a P-value cause a 
significant significant 
di fference? difference? 
Antiarmor 
Engagements 0.0215 YES 0.0006 YES 
survivability 0.0071 YES 0.0039 YES 
'l'arget 
Stealing 0.0003 YES 0.0197 YES 
Lethality 0.0023 0.0020 YES 
Table 6. Summary of test levels of s~gn~f~cance. 
While the statistical analysis certainly shows that the 
Javel in enhances the unit's operational effectiveness, it 
may still be difficult to measure other advantages not 
defined in terms of MOEs. Many commanders may describe 
these advantages in tenns of saving lives, time, and 
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maintaining flexibility on the battlefield. For each 
commander, these advantages are personally Weighted by how 
much he values each contribution provided by the Javelin. 
As an example, the results of the anti armor fires 
indicate that engagement ranges for the mechanized infantry 
platoon with the Javelin in the defense extends hundreds of 
meters further than with the Dragon. This same finding is 
true for the aechanized company in the movement to contact 
mission. I.n both cases, the Javelin provides better 
standoff with longer distanced armor kills. To tbe military 
commander, this standoff gives a tactical advantage on the 
battlefield. The more standoff he bas, the more capable his 
force is to ward off the threat of close combat and slow the 
tempo of the enemy attack. Additionally, by delaying the 
enemy, the commander gains more time to make tactical 
decisions. 
Further, when standoff no longer exists, enemy tank 
fires expose the vulnerability of the BFV. When opposing 
tanks penetrate the standoff range of the TOW missiles, blue 
forces lose a number of their BFVs. In some cases, units 
with the Dragon SUffer the loss of all the BFVs. The force 
survivability at this point begins to decrease at a quicker 
pace. This is primarily due to the lack of support the 
Dragon provides outside a range of one kilometer. with a 
range of two thousand meters, the Javelin reduces the number 
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of enemy tanks closing in on the BFVs. Thus, the 
observations of both the defensive and offensive operations 
show that the Javelin helps sustains force survivability at 
a much higher level. Particularly in the defense, force 
survivability is .improved almost thirty-three percent more 
than observed with the Dragon. To the company commander 
this implies that possibly one third more of his combat 
power, namely a platoon, may survive. 
Additionally, the fire and forget capability of the 
Javelin, gives the gunner the potential to shoot, move, and 
seek cover. Unlike the BFVs, the Javelin gunner is 
therefore less likely to be exposed to enemy fire s . This 
gives the Javelin gunner the ability to survive longer on 
t he battlefield and continue to destroy targets. As a 
result, both missions show that the Javelin destroys at 
least five of the ten vehicles from the opposing tank 
company. This peculiarity of the Javelin brings about an 
option for the commander not to expose and employ all his 
BFVs but rather make better use of his Javelin gunners. 
This option gives the commander more flexibility on the 
battlefield when employing his soldiers and equipment. 
with the addition of the Javelin, the lethality of the 
commander I S forces is increased. In both scenarios, the 
Javelin individually destroys three times more enemy 
vehicles than the Dragon. At this rate, four Javelins 
48 
enployed at the platoon level have the potential to destroy 
as many armor targets as the twelve Dragons at the c01f,pany 
level for the same mission. 
In summary, the results of the experimental data 
analysis indicate that the Javelin performs in a superior 
to the Dragon across all four measures of 
effectiveness. These results support evidence that the 
Javelin equipped mechanized unit has the ability to kill 
enemy forces from greater distances and with greater 
lethality, \oIhile maintaining improved survivability. In 
essence, two platoons with Javelin exhibit the conbat power 
in terms of survivability and lethality of one company 
(three platoons) similarly equipped with Dragon. For the 
military commander, the contributions of the Javelin make it 
possible to increase the robustness of the mechanized force. 
As a conclusion, the Javelin's qualities make it a favorable 
alternati'lE! for t.he Dragon and prove it to be a worthy 
combat multiplier to the Mechanized Infantry's arsenal. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this study: the Javelin weapon system is determined 
to be a favorable replacement for the Dragon in the 
deliberate defense and movement to contact missions. In 
both scenarios the Javelin plays a supportive role. This 
method of employment provides a genuine representation of 
how the Javelin is primarily employed in the field. The 
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Javelin is not a .close combat assault weapon nor should it 
be modeled as such. The Javelin's primary mode of fire is 
top attack. Janus(A), however, models the Javelin as a 
direct fire (line of sight) weapon. The Javelin's ability 
to fire above trees and other ground clutter, deviations in 
elevation of terrain, and dust and smoke close to the ground 
allow it to maintain a high probability, Ph, of hit. In 
Janus (A), Ph is degraded based upon the number and level of 
vegetation cells that a weapon's line of sight passes 
through to the target. Due to this present representation 
and the advent of the Javel in's top attack mode, it is 
recommended that ~he Janus(A) model be refined to represent 
the high trajectory firing which is characteristic of the 
Javelin. 
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